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1. Introduction 
In the recent wave of globalization, the vertical division of labor among 
production stages has developed worldwide. The well-known example is automobile 
production in the US-Mexico nexus. Cross-border production sharing between the US 
and Mexico has been accompanied by back-and-forth intra-firm transactions between 
headquarters in the US and their assembly plants in Maquila, Mexico. The WE (Western 
Europe)-CEE (Central and Eastern Europe) nexus is another example. Indeed, exports 
of finished machinery products from CEE to WE have experienced a rapid increase.1 
Such a division of labor is clearly important for the economic growth of developing 
countries. It encourages the transfer of the superior know-how and technology in 
developed countries to developing countries, thereby contributing to the enhancement of 
firm productivity in the developing countries. 
There have been a number of theoretical papers that have sought to clarify the 
mechanics of the vertical division of labor among production processes (e.g., Jones and 
Kierzkowski, 1990). Academically this division of labor has become virtually 
interchangeable with the terms fragmentation, outsourcing, or vertical specialization.  
Fragmentation is the splitting of a product process into two or more steps that lead to 
the same final product. When a fragmented production block is placed beyond national 
borders, the fragmentation is called “international fragmentation” or “cross-border 
fragmentation”. International fragmentation is also discussed within the context of 
vertical foreign direct investment (VFDI). Studies show that theoretically once 
fragmentation becomes possible due to trade cost reductions, multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) in a country (often termed a developed country) locate their affiliates in a 
country (often termed a developing country) which has a comparative advantage in 
assembly processes. The MNEs then engage in a production-process vertical division of 
labor by exporting intermediate products to their affiliates. This two-country version of 
VFDI has recently come to be known as “pure VFDI”. 
However, “traditional” theories of the vertical division of labor, e.g. pure VFDI 
theory, cannot adequately explain the recent expansion in the more complicated 
international production systems. UNCTAD (2002) states that: During the past 15 years, 
falling barriers to international transactions have not only invigorated global markets 
through arm’s-length transactions but given rise to elaborate corporate systems of 
organizing the production process. As a result, international production systems have 
emerged within which TNCs[MNEs] locate different parts of the production processes, 
including various services functions, across the globe, to take advantage of fine 
                                                  
1 See Ando and Kimura (2007) and Hanson et al. (2005). 
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differences in costs, resources, logistics and markets. As Yeaple (2003) and Grossman et 
al. (2006) have pointed out, such MNE strategy is known as complex integration 
strategy (UNCTAD, 1993; 1998). The production systems in this strategy are 
accompanied by a production-process vertical division of labor involving more than two 
countries and are surely one form of VFDIs. However, traditional VFDI theory cannot 
depict these complicated production systems because pure VFDI theory assumes a 
model in which each MNE selects one country with the lowest production costs in 
activities that it wishes to relocate among all potential destination countries. That is, in 
pure VFDI theory, MNEs are supposed to engage in a vertical division of labor between 
two countries (host and home countries). Thus, we need a VFDI model that allows 
MNEs to have multiple affiliates in order to get more detailed insight into recent 
international production systems. 
“Complex VFDI” theory could be the model for exploring the mechanics of the 
more complicated international production systems. Recently third-country effects have 
attracted much more attention in FDI theories which are being reconstructed in a 
three-country framework, not the traditional two-country setting (Baltagi et al., 2007; 
Ekholm et al., 2007; Grossman et al., 2006; Yeaple, 2003). As briefly illustrated in 
section 3, complex VFDI is a model in which an MNE sets up its vertical chain of 
production across multiple countries to exploit the differences in factor prices. Imagine 
that an MNE in a country (home country) locates its affiliate in another country (host 
country) and becomes engaged in the vertical division of labor between the two 
countries. If production processes in the host country can be further fragmented, and 
near the host country there is yet another country (third country) with comparative 
advantages in undertaking a part of the processes done in the host country, the MNE 
will relocate such a part of the processes from the host country to the third country. The 
result is that the MNE now has two affiliates and engages in a three-country vertical 
division of labor. This MNE strategy is like the one in the aforementioned recent 
international production systems. Thus, complex VFDI theory would be helpful for 
examining their mechanics. 
In this paper we statistically test the validity of the mechanics of complex VFDI 
in Japanese machinery FDI to East Asia. International production and distribution 
networks in East Asia have developed dramatically in the machinery industries, 
particularly in the electronic machinery industry, since the 1990s. Indeed, East Asia 
consists of countries with different levels of economic development (i.e. different factor 
prices), and thus is a suitable region for the development of a production-process 
vertical division of labor among multiple countries. Japanese MNEs in particular have 
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played the most important role in developing such networks. By diversifying the 
location of their affiliates, they have extended their international production networks 
all over East Asia. As a result, each Japanese MNE often has more than one affiliate 
within East Asia, as we will see in the next section. Such Japanese MNE strategy in East 
Asia implies that Japanese machinery FDI to that region can be a good example of the 
above-mentioned complicated production systems of MNEs. In this paper we apply the 
complex VFDI theory to explore Japanese machinery FDI to East Asia in the electronic 
machinery industry. Such an analysis will contribute to our understanding of the 
mechanics of recent more complex international production systems. 
We first classify Japanese machinery FDI to East Asia by FDI type and find that 
most of the Japanese affiliates in East Asia producing information and communication 
electronics equipment and electronic parts and devices are complex VFDI. With this 
finding in mind, we next investigate the relationships of geographical proximity and 
factor price differentials among affiliates of an MNE. According to our model, in 
complex VFDI, overseas plants are linked with one another through proximity and 
factor price differentials among countries. If this argument is correct, we should find a 
positive relationship in Japanese FDI to East Asia in the production of information and 
communication electronics equipment and electronic parts and devices. To examine 
such relationships, we employ spatial econometric techniques, particularly a spatial-lag 
model.2 Furthermore, this paper extends conceptually the complex VFDI model so as to 
allow for heterogeneity among firms. The well-known Melitz model tells us that only 
firms with higher productivity can afford to pay the costs for exporting activity and 
moving overseas (Melitz, 2003; Helpman et al., 2004). Clearly complex VFDI is a 
fixed-cost-consuming strategy because it costs firms a great amount to set up affiliates 
in multiple countries. This argument implies that compared with firms with low 
productivity, firms with high productivity are likely to undertake complex VFDI. We 
statistically test this argument by augmenting our spatial-lag model. 
Our paper is in line with other empirical studies. First, it is related to Feinberg and 
Keane (2006) in the sense that we classify FDI according to certain criteria (which is 
presented in the next section). Feinberg and Keane used Bureau of Economic Analysis 
data on U.S. MNEs and found that 12% and 19% of them are pure horizontal FDI (pure 
HFDI) and pure VFDI, respectively, while the rest have adopted more complex 
integration strategies. Our paper further identifies quantitatively the complex FDI of the 
vertical type among the MNEs adopting complex integration strategies. Second, our 
paper is related to the studies that analyze FDI by spatial econometrics (Coughlin and 
                                                  
2 See Anselin (1988) for more details of spatial econometrics,. 
 4
Segev, 2000; Baltagi et al., 2007; Blonigen et al., 2007). In particular, our paper is 
closest to Blonigen et al. (2007), which estimates the spatial-lag model and seeks to 
empirically differentiate FDI types (pure HFDI, export-platform, pure VFDI, and 
complex VFDI) in US outbound FDI. Although our paper basically follows the 
methodology employed in Blonigen et al. (2007), we introduce weighting matrices not 
only for bilateral distance but also for wage gaps based on the predictions of our model. 
This enables us to more successfully test the validity of the mechanics of complex VFDI. 
Third, our analysis on the relationship between overseas activity and firm productivity 
is clearly in line with a large number of firm-level studies, e.g., Bernard and Jensen 
(1999) and Head and Ries (2003). Our analysis of the relationship between firm 
productivity and their choice of VFDI strategy adds new facts to this literature. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents 
some preliminary evidence on Japanese machinery FDI. In section 3, we describe the 
problem of selecting a VFDI pattern, i.e., pure VFDI or complex VFDI. Section 4 
explains our empirical methodology for examining the mechanics of Japanese FDI to 
East Asian countries, and section 5 reports our regression results. Section 6 presents our 
conclusions. 
 
 
2. Overview of Japanese Machinery FDI 
Before discussing the specifications of analysis, we will present some preliminary 
evidence on Japanese machinery FDI. To do this, we use the micro database of Kaigai 
Jigyou Katsudou Kihon (Doukou) Chousa (Survey on Overseas Business Activities, 
hereafter SOBA) prepared by the Research and Statistics Department, Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry (hereafter, METI). More details on this database are 
provided in section 4. As will be argued later, we employ data on the intra-firm trade of 
affiliates to identify complex VFDI. Thus, this section restricts the sample period only 
to years in which such data are available: 1995, 1998, and 2001. The country list is 
presented in Appendix A. 
Table 1 presents the average number of overseas manufacturing affiliates by 
region, parent-company size and industry for Japanese machinery MNEs. 
Parent-company size is measured by the number of employees. Four points are 
noteworthy. First, there is a difference in the average number of affiliates depending on 
region. Japanese MNEs in almost all machinery industries, irrespective of parent size, 
own more than two manufacturing affiliates in both Asia and Europe while the average 
number of such affiliates in North America is around one. Second, in Asia and Europe 
 5
there are marked differences among parent industries in the number of affiliate. In Asia 
MNEs in the information and communication devices industry have more than three 
manufacturing affiliates on average while those in the transportation equipment and 
precision instruments industries have less than two manufacturing affiliates. The same is 
also true for Europe, but we do not find such a difference for North America. Third, 
there seems to be a positive correlation between parent size and the number of overseas 
manufacturing affiliates. In the case of the general machinery industry in Asia in 1995, 
for example, while the average number of manufacturing affiliates for large firms was 
2.52, that for small firms was 1.21. The same sort of ratio can be seen in other years, 
other industries, and other regions, particularly Europe. Fourth, there has been an 
upward trend in the average number of overseas manufacturing affiliates in Asia for 
large firms, but not for small ones. In the general machinery industry in Asia, for 
example, small firms had on average 2.91 and 2.37 affiliates in Asia in 1995 and 2001, 
respectively; during the period the average number of affiliates for large firms increased 
from 3.87 to 4.17. Another outstanding point is that such an upward trend can only be 
seen in Asia. 
 
==  Table 1  == 
 
Turning to the type of manufacturing affiliates, Table 2 shows the ratio of 
vertical-type overseas affiliates to all overseas manufacturing affiliates by region and 
industry. While HFDI is investment for the purpose of avoiding broadly-defined trade 
costs by setting up plants within a targeted market/country rather than by exporting 
from the home country, VFDI is for exploiting the low price-production factors of the 
host country. In other words, most of the goods produced by HFDI affiliates are 
intended for sale in the host country, but the sale of products from VFDI affiliates is 
basically not aimed at the host country. Thus, we define VFDI statistically as affiliates 
in which the share of local sales to total sales is less than 50%. Table 2 shows that 
compared with affiliates in North America and Europe, those in Asia tend to be the 
vertical type; more than half of the affiliates in Asia are vertical type. In the case of 
information and communication devices in 2001, for example, 58% of Asian affiliates 
were the VFDI type while for North America and Europe it was 22% and 16%, 
respectively. This result indicates the substantial growth that the vertical production 
networks of Japanese MNEs have experienced in Asia. 
 
==  Table 2  == 
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In conducting our analysis, we decompose Japanese machinery VFDI into two 
types, pure and complex VFDI. We define the following affiliates as complex VFDI: 
affiliates with intra-firm sales to and intra-firm procurements from third countries, 
affiliates with both intra-firm sales to third countries and intra-firm procurements from 
Japan, and affiliates with both intra-firm sales to Japan and intra-firm procurements 
from third countries.3 Table 3 compares the ratio of complex VFDI to the pure type. 
Compared with North America and Europe, the ratios are again higher in Asia. In the 
electronic machinery and information devices industries in particular, near half of all the 
VFDI affiliates are of the complex type. Furthermore, the ratios in the two industries 
rise slightly during the sample period, accounting for 40% and 42% respectively in 
2001. 
 
==  Table 3  == 
 
Table 4 shows that the ratio of complex VFDI in Asia is a little higher for 
affiliates that belong to parents with more than 1,000 employees. In 2001, for example, 
35% of Asian affiliates in large MNEs were complex VFDI types while 31% were 
classified as such in small MNEs. This fact suggests that large MNEs enjoy more 
benefits from a vertical chain of production across multiple countries. Table 5 provides 
the ratio for complex VFDI according to firm productivity. We measured this 
productivity using total factor productivity (TFP), about which details will be presented 
later. The results are qualitatively similar to those in Table 4, i.e., more productive firms 
are likely to have more complex VFDI affiliates. 
 
==  Tables 4 and 5  == 
 
 
3. The Model 
This section examines the problem of selecting a VFDI pattern, i.e. pure or 
complex, in order to clarify the mechanics of complex VFDI. To do that, it is essential 
to extend the pure VFDI model to at least a three-country and three-production stage 
setting. Within this setting, this section will describe the kinds of countries that can 
                                                  
3 In the classification of complex VFDI, the magnitude/ratio of intra-firm transactions is not taken 
into account. Furthermore, we actually do not examine if transactions with Japan are intra-firm or 
not since data on such transactions are likely to be not available and affiliate transactions with Japan 
are by and large intra-firm ones. 
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attract investment from the home country, while allowing for heterogeneity among firms 
in terms of productivity. It should be noted that the aim of this section is not to provide a 
general equilibrium model of multi-production-stage and multi-country VFDI but 
simply to get insights into the driving forces working behind VFDI to multiple countries 
with various factor prices in a partial equilibrium model. 
 
3.1. Settings 
Suppose that there are four countries: country 1 (home country), country 2, 
country 3, and a country in the outside economy. In this supposition we consider 
finished machinery products that are horizontally differentiated. Each of a continuum of 
firms manufactures a different brand with zero measure. The finished machinery 
products are consumed only in the outside economy and are transported from any of the 
three countries without any charge. Consumers in the outside economy country have the 
CES utility function in the consumption of brand k, x(k), such that: 
( )αα 1)(∫ Ω∈= k dkkxU ,  0 < α < 1. 
Ω denotes a set of varieties available in the outside economy country. With this utility 
function we can derive the demand function of a brand as x(k) = A p(k)-ε, where x is its 
quantity, p is its price,  
( ) 11)( −Ω∈ −∫≡ k dkkpEA ε , 
ε≡1/(1-α), and E is the total expenditure in the outside country. A is a measure of the 
demand level and is taken as exogenous by producers. 
The market structure of the finished machinery-goods sector is monopolistic 
competition. Firms and their headquarters are assumed to locate only in country 1 
(home country) for simplicity. Each firm knows its cost efficiency θ only after its entry 
to the market. The machinery products are produced in three stages of production. The 
production function in each stage is kept as simple as possible to bring out the nature of 
dependence among production stages. Our Leontief-type production structure is as 
follows. A first stage product is produced inputting θ units of knowledge; a second stage 
product is produced inputting one unit of the first stage product and θ units of 
skilled-labor; a third stage product (i.e. finished machinery product) is produced with 
input of one unit of the second stage product and θ units of unskilled-labor. Factor 
prices for knowledge, skilled-labor, and unskilled-labor are represented by h, r, and w, 
respectively. 
For simplicity we assume that only country 1 has knowledge, so that the first 
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stage can be produced only in country 1, i.e. home country. It is also assumed that w1 > 
w2 > w3 and that r1 > r3 > r2, which indicate that the home country is generally the 
highest in both skilled and unskilled labor while countries 2 and 3 are the lowest in 
skilled and unskilled labor, respectively. 4  The assumption of factor prices order 
indicates simply that countries 2 and 3 have location advantages in producing the 
second-stage and third-stage products, respectively. There are ice-berg trade costs tij (≥1) 
for the shipment of each stage-product between countries i and j (tij = 1 if i = j). 
Although firms do not need to pay any fixed costs if they produce all stage-products in 
only country 1, they must incur plant set-up costs f if they locate plants abroad. But if 
firms produce products of both the second and the third stages in country i, they only 
need to pay f, not 2f. 
Although the first stage of production always is located in country 1, there are 
still 9 (3x3) possible location combinations. Given the assumption on the order in factor 
prices, however, we can rule out four combinations. Let πlm be gross profit in the 
production combination: (2nd stage country, 3rd stage country) = (l, m). Then it always 
holds that π22 > π12, π22 > π21, π33 > π13, and π33 > π31. This is because countries 2 and 3 
have more location advantages in producing the second- and third-stage products than 
country 1. We also rule out the combination (3, 2).5 As a result, we will need to consider 
only the following four combinations: (2nd stage country, 3rd stage country) = (1, 1), (2, 
2), (3, 3), and (2, 3). 
Let clm be total cost in the production pattern (l, m), then c11, c22, c33, and c23 are 
given by: 
c11 = (h1θ + r1θ + w1θ)x,  
c22 = (t12h1θ + r2θ + w2θ)x + f 
c33 = (t13h1θ + r3θ + w3θ)x + f 
c23 = (t12t23h1θ + t23r2θ + w3θ)x + 2f. 
The profit-maximizing strategy yields p = cijx /α, where cijx = d cij/d x, so that profits are 
                                                  
4 Imagine country 2 as a NIE (namely, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, or Korea) and country 3 as 
an ASEAN developing country. Although both skilled and unskilled labor are generally not cheap in 
the NIEs, skilled labor is scarce in the ASEAN countries. As a result, skilled labor might become 
more expensive in the ASEAN countries than in the NIEs. 
5 Specifically, we assume that (t12 - t13) t23h1 + t23 (r2 - r3) + (w3 - w2) < 0. The combination (3, 2) is 
the production pattern that does not fully enjoy differences in factor prices between countries 2 and 3, 
particularly compared with the combination (2, 3). However, the combination (3, 2) is always more 
profitable than the combination (2, 3) if trade costs between home and country 2 are much higher 
than those between home and country 3 (i.e., (t12 - t13) t23h1 + t23 (r2 - r3) + (w3 - w2) > 0). But the aim 
of this type of multiple-country production is not to enjoy differences in factor prices but to reduce 
the total burden of trade costs. That is, trade with country 2 is not a vertical division of labor but 
purely entrepot trade. Such a production pattern is not our interest in this study. 
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given by:  
π11 = (h1 + r1 + w1)1-ε Θ 
π22 = (t12h1 + r2 + w2)1-ε Θ - f 
π33 = (t13h1 + r3 + w3)1-ε Θ - f 
π23 = (t12t23h1 + t23r2 + w3)1-ε Θ - 2f,  
where Θ ≡ A(1-α)αε-1 θ1-ε. We call Θ the productivity measure. Since ε > 1, the smaller 
the cost efficiency θ is, the larger the measure Θ is. 
 
3.2. Pure VFDI vs. Complex VFDI 
     We will first consider the problem of selecting among (1, 1), (2, 2), and (3, 3), i.e. 
among domestic and two types of pure VFDI. If the location advantages in producing 
the second- and third-stage products in countries 2 and 3 are trivial compared with 
country 1, π11 is always higher than π22 and π33 due to the existence of trade costs 
between host and home countries. To shed light on the production pattern of interest in 
this study, i.e. the international production-stage division of labor, we restrict ourselves 
only to the cases where the location advantages in countries 2 and 3 are relevant. 
Specifically, we assume (1 - t12) h1 + (r1 – r2) + (w1 – w2) > 0 and (1 - t13) h1 + (r1 – r3) + 
(w1 – w3) > 0. Then, drawn as a function of the productivity measure Θ, π22 and π33 are 
steeper than π11.  
From the slope of π22 and π33, however, we can draw two different figures 
concerning profits. Figure 1 depicts the case where country 2 has much lower factor 
prices for skilled labor or better access to the home country than country 3. Specifically, 
h1(t12 - t13) + (r2 - r3) + (w2 - w3) < 0. Then, since π22 is always higher than π33, firms 
choose either the pure VFDI of the second and third production stages to country 2 or 
the domestic production of all stages (Domestic). As is evident from the figure, firms 
with high productivity choose the pure VFDI to country 2, while firms with low 
productivity choose the domestic production of all stages (Domestic) because variable 
profit cannot cover fixed costs f. Figure 2 shows the case where h1(t12 - t13) + (r2 - r3) + 
(w2 - w3) > 0. As in Figure 1, firms with high productivity choose pure VFDI to country 
3, while firms with low productivity choose the domestic production of all stages. As a 
result, the partner of pure VFDI depends on whether h1(t12 - t13) + (r2 - r3) + (w2 - w3) 
becomes positive or negative. Given the location advantages, to attract pure VFDI, 
foreign countries need to reduce trade costs with potential investing countries more 
greatly than competitors. As we will see below, however, such a “race to bottom” in 
trade costs with the investing countries does not necessarily occur if we allow the 
further geographical separation of production stages. 
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==  Figures 1-2  == 
 
     To see this, we add an alternative of “Complex VFDI”, i.e. the pattern (2, 3). As 
with Figures 1 and 2, two different figures can be drawn according to the slope of π22 
and π33. At this stage, we restrict our attention only to the case where π22 is always 
higher than π33, i.e. h1(t12 - t13) + (r2 - r3) + (w2 - w3) < 0. Furthermore, if the location 
advantages in producing the third-stage products in country 3 are trivial compared with 
country 2, the slope of π22 is always higher than that of π23 due to the additional burden 
of trade costs between host countries. Specifically, if (t12h1+ r2)(1- t23) + (w2 - w3) < 0, 
complex VFDI never occurs. Below we will focus on the case where the slope of π22 is 
larger than that of π23, i.e. (t12h1+ r2)(1- t23) + (w2 - w3) > 0. 
We can again draw two different figures. In Figure 3 the intersection between line 
π22 and line π23 lies on the right-hand side of the intersection between line π11 and line 
π22. This emerges when, for example, the gap in factor prices for unskilled labor 
between countries 2 and 3 is not large enough or the trade costs between countries 2 and 
3 are not low enough. In this figure, firms with high productivity choose complex VFDI, 
firms with medium productivity choose pure VFDI, and firms with low productivity 
choose domestic production of all stages. On the other hand, if gap in factor prices for 
unskilled labor between countries 2 and 3 is large enough or trade costs between 
countries 2 and 3 are low enough, as shown in Figure 4, complex VFDI becomes a more 
profitable strategy for firms than pure VFDI regardless of the level of productivity. 
Therefore, firms with low or high productivity choose domestic production and 
complex VFDI, respectively. In summary, the larger the gap in factor prices between 
host countries, i.e. countries 2 and 3, or the lower the trade costs between them, the 
more likely are firms to choose complex VFDI as their dominant strategy. Furthermore, 
firms with higher productivity tend to choose a complex VFDI strategy. 
 
==  Figures 3-4  == 
      
As can be seen from the above figures, the key drivers in our model are the gap in 
the factor prices and the trade costs among the countries. One important point is that not 
only trade costs between home and potential host countries but also those between host 
countries must be low enough for the development of multiple-country VFDI, i.e. 
complex VFDI. This implies that a country might attract a part of MNE production if 
the country reduces its trade costs with another country where a large number of MNEs 
 11
have already invested. Another important point is that each country needs to have 
production stages that best match its location advantages compared to other countries. 
Thus, countries might be more successful in attracting MNEs by selectively 
encouraging the best parts of their production environment. Finally, taking geographical 
distance as the major source of trade costs, we can summarize the mechanics of 
complex VFDI as the following testable hypotheses: 
 
Testable Hypothesis 1: In complex VFDI, overseas plants are linked with one another 
through geographical proximity and factor price differentials among countries. 
 
Testable Hypothesis 2: MNEs with high productivity are more likely to choose a 
complex VFDI strategy than those with low productivity. 
 
 
3.3. Other Types of FDI 
     So far, we have listed the characteristics of complex VFDI. In the remainder of 
this section, we will briefly summarize those of the other types of FDI, i.e., pure HFDI 
and export-platform FDI. We will examine in particular the relationship to the proximity 
and the factor price differentials of third countries in the other types of FDI. 
     Blonigen et al. (2007) studied the relationship of pure HFDI and export-platform 
FDI to the proximity of third countries. Regarding the former, they argue that the pure 
HFDI model would not be associated with any spatial relationship between FDI into 
neighboring markets as the MNE makes independent decisions about the extent to 
which it will serve that market through exports or affiliate sales. On the other hand, in 
export-platform FDI, a parent country invests in a particular host country with the 
intention of serving “third” markets with exports of final goods from the affiliate in the 
host country, and the MNE will choose the most preferred destination market. In short, 
pure HFDI is not related to the proximity of third countries, and export-platform FDI is 
negatively related to it. Thus when investigating the relationship of third-country 
proximity, we can differentiate complex VFDI from pure HFDI and export-platform 
FDI. 
     One may worry about the impact of border costs on pure HFDI, which is also 
discussed in Blonigen et al. (2007). Suppose there are ten countries, five of which have 
relatively large demand but high border costs. Then, MNEs would invest to each of the 
five countries to get access to their demand. If the five countries geographically happen 
to be concentrated in a particular area, it would seem that such HFDI, as well as the 
 12
complex VFDI, would have a positive relationship to the proximity of third countries. 
However, examining the relationship to factor price differentials enables us to 
successfully differentiate complex VFDI from such HFDI because the latter does not 
have any relationship to third-country factor price differentials. Thus, FDI having a 
positive relationship to both the proximity of third countries and the factor price 
differentials of third countries is without doubt complex VFDI. 
 
 
4. Empirical Methodology 
In section 2 we confirmed that most Japanese overseas affiliates in East Asia 
producing information and communication electronics equipment and electronic parts 
and devices can be categorized as complex VFDI. Indeed, East Asia seems to be 
potentially the most suitable region for the development of complex VFDI since it 
consists of countries with different stages of economic development. Furthermore, 
under information technology agreements, the general tariff rates for those sectors are 
low or zero. Thus the necessary conditions for the development of complex VFDI are 
well satisfied in those sectors in East Asia. In the following sections we empirically 
investigate whether or not Japanese FDI to East Asia in those sectors has the 
above-discussed characteristics of complex VFDI. In this section we will explain our 
empirical methodology. 
Based on our model, in complex VFDI, the production activity of affiliates in a 
given country is positively related to that of affiliates in neighboring countries having 
large differences in factor prices with the given country. Therefore we will examine the 
relationship between the activity of each affiliate and the activity of affiliates located in 
other East Asian countries and belonging to the same parent firm. If the above two 
testable hypotheses are correct, we should find a positive relationship in both 
geographical proximity and gap in factor prices in Japanese FDI to East Asia. Our 
analysis will focus on firms in information and communication electronics equipment 
and electronic parts and devices, industries in which most Japanese overseas affiliates in 
East Asia can be classified as complex VFDI, as pointed out in section 2. 
We employ spatial econometric techniques in order to enable us to incorporate the 
activity of affiliates in third countries into our empirical framework. Although we lose a 
great degree of freedom by adding the activity variables in each third country separately 
as explanatory variables, a spatial-lag model can analyze the above-discussed 
relationships without losing any degree of freedom. Our spatial-lag model is as follows. 
Let Yitj denote a log of sales for the affiliate of firm },,1{ mj K∈  in country 
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The spatial-lag equation we estimate first is: 
Y = ρD WDY + ρG WGY + Xβ + ε. 
Y is an N×1 vector, where N = 90m. X includes standard variables in the pure VFDI 
theory: wages, country risk, geographical distance from Japan (home country). ε is a 
vector of disturbances. WD and WG are weighting matrices and are constructed as 
follows: 
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where dti,k and gti,k are the geographical proximity (inverse of distance) and the wage gap 
between countries i and k in year t, respectively. Since distances are time-invariant, 
WDj1994 = WDj1995 = … = WDj2003.  Each weighting matrix is symmetric and 
row-normalized. Contrary to Blonigen el al. (2007), our equation has two kinds of 
weighting matrices. We call such an equation a “multiple spatial-lag model”. 
As is well known, ordinary least squares estimates (OLS estimates) are biased as 
well as inconsistent for the parameters of the spatial model. Our multiple spatial-lag 
model is also no exception. By rewriting the above equation as: 
Y = Zρ + Xβ + ε,  
where Z = [WDY, WGY] and ρ = [ρD, ρG]’, we can express our OLS estimate γOLS for ρ 
as: 
γOLS = ρ + [Z’MZ]-1 Z’Mε, 
where M = I – X(X’X)-1X’. The expected value of the second term is not equal to zero, 
therefore the OLS estimate is biased. Furthermore, while the probability limit of 
N-1(Z’MZ) can be a finite and nonsingular matrix, that of N-1(Z’Mε) is not equal to 
zero. Thus, the OLS estimate is not only biased but also inconsistent. To obtain 
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consistent estimators, we perform a two-stage least squares (2SLS). Following Kelejian 
and Prucha (1998) and Dow (2007), we use X, WDX, and WGX as instruments for WDY 
and WGY. Our 2SLS estimate γ2SLS for ρ is given by: 
γ2SLS = [Z’H(H’H)-1H’MH(H’H)-1H’Z]-1 [Z’H(H’H)-1H’MY] 
where H = [X, WDX, WGX], instrument matrix. The significantly positive sign of ρD 
and ρG implies that production activity in each affiliate is positively related to that in 
affiliates in neighboring countries with large differences in factor prices, as our model 
of complex VFDI predicts. 
We will turn next to examining if the type of VFDI depends on firm productivity 
or not. We will do this by estimating the following equation: 
Y = ρD (I + λD A)WDY + ρG (I + λG A)WGY + Xβ + ε, 
where I is the square matrix with ones on the main diagonal and zeros elsewhere 
(identity matrix), and: 
A = . 
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ajt denotes productivity in firm j in year t. As argued above, if all Japanese firms’ FDI to 
East Asia is complex VFDI, the sign of both ρD and ρG should be positive. On the other 
hand, if all Japanese firms’ FDI to East Asia is pure VFDI, in which an MNE selects 
one country with the lowest production costs, affiliate activities would not have any 
spatial relationship, i.e., ρD and ρG are estimated to be insignificant. Thus, as illustrated 
in the previous section, if firms with high productivity are likely to perform complex 
VFDI and firms with low productivity tend to perform pure VFDI, the estimation of 
both λD and λG should be significantly positive. 
Our data sources are as follows. As in section 2, we use the micro database of 
SOBA for affiliate sales. The aim of SOBA is to obtain basic information on the 
activities of the foreign affiliates of Japanese firms. The survey covers all Japanese 
firms that have affiliates abroad. The main information in SOBA includes such items as 
the year of affiliate establishment, the breakdown of sales and purchases, employment, 
costs, and research and development. (For more information on the items in SOBA, see 
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“Survey Form for Oversea Affiliates” and “Guide for Completing the Survey”6). 
Regarding the sources of the regressors, data on the average wages in each country are 
estimated by aggregating the affiliate-level wage data in SOBA. The country risk index 
is drawn from “Institutional Investor: International edition” (Institutional Investor). This 
index is the aggregate evaluation of bankers on the risk of default; the larger the index 
the lower the risk of a country defaulting. Data on distance are drawn from the CEPII 
website.7 The data on GDP and GDP deflator for each country can be obtained from 
“World Development Indicators” (World Bank). Those for Taiwan are from the 
“Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China” (Taipei: Directorate-Genral of Budget, 
Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Republic of China). 
We use firms’ TFP as the measurement of their productivity, data for which were 
drawn from METI’s Kigyou Katsudou Kihon Chousa Houkokusho (Results of the Basic 
Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities, hereafter BSJBSA).8 From this 
data we estimate the TFP index following Caves et al. (1982, 1983) and Good et al. 
(1983). The TFP index is calculated as follows: 
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where Qit, sift and Xift denote the shipments of firm i in year t, the cost share of input f for 
firm i in year t, and input of factor f for firm i in year t, respectively. The inputs are labor, 
capital, and intermediates. Variables with an upper bar denote the industry average for 
that variable. We define a hypothetical (representative) firm for each year and industry. 
Its input and output are calculated as the geometric means of the input and output of all 
establishments in the industry. The first two terms on the right-hand side of the equation 
denote the cross-sectional TFP index based on the Theil-Tornqvist specification for each 
firm and year relative to the hypothetical establishment. Since the cross-sectional TFP 
indexes for t and t-1 are not comparable, we adjust the cross-sectional TFP index with 
the TFP growth rate of the hypothetical firm, which is represented by the third and 
fourth terms in the equation. For more details on the construction of these variables, see 
Appendix B. 
                                                  
6 Downloadable from the METI web site:  
http://www.meti.go.jp/english/statistics/tyo/kaigaizi/index.html. 
7 http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm. 
8 This survey was first conducted in 1991, then in 1994, and annually thereafter. The survey covers 
all firms, both manufacturing and non-manufacturing, with more than 50 employees and capitalized 
at more than 30 million yen. 
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5. Empirical Results 
This section reports the regression results from examination of the above two 
testable hypotheses. The correlation matrix is shown in Table 6. 
 
==  Table 6  == 
 
The regression results for the first hypothesis are provided in Table 7. We 
performed not only a 2SLS estimation but also an OLS one. First, the results for the 
standard bilateral variables look good. Coefficients for country risk and wages have the 
expected sign, positive for country risk and negative for wages. These results indicate 
that Japanese MNEs seek out the low-wage and low-risk countries in East Asia as the 
pure VFDI theory predicts. In particular, one may say that country risk partly embodies 
the set-up costs of affiliates. If this argument is correct, the significantly positive 
coefficient for country risk implies that low plant set-up costs are surely one of the 
major determinants of Japanese VFDI. On the other hand, the sign of the coefficients for 
both GDP and distance from Japan are not what we had expected. Second, the 
coefficients for weighting matrices, where our interest lies, are significantly estimated 
with the expected sign in the OLS estimation of (1). The positive coefficients of both 
matrices imply that the affiliates belonging to each Japanese MNE are linked with one 
another through proximity and wage differentials. In other words, we can say that the 
mechanics of complex VFDI work in Japanese FDI to East Asia. But, such results 
worsen in the 2SLS estimation. The coefficient for the proximity matrix turns out to be 
insignificant. This result seems to be due to the high correlation between the two 
matrices, i.e. multi-colinearity. Indeed, as in Table 5, such correlation is 0.80. By 
introducing the two matrices separately, we get significantly positive 2SLS coefficients 
for both matrices. 
 
==  Table 7  == 
 
The regression results for the second hypothesis are provided in Table 8. To 
decrease the pairs of variables with high correlation, i.e., to avoid the multi-colinearity 
problem, we drop some weighting matrix-related variables. First, we eliminate the 
proximity and gap matrices. The omission of these variables does not lead to 
omitted-variable bias since their coefficients show correlation in the case of pure VFDI 
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(i.e. zero) once we introduce their products to firm productivity. The results are in 
column (4). Both the OLS and 2SLS estimates have the expected signs though the 
coefficients for the interaction terms are insignificant in the 2SLS estimate. Next, as an 
extreme, we introduce each weighting matrix-related variable separately; the results are 
shown in columns (5) and (6). Both of the coefficients for their products to TFP are 
estimated as significantly positive, indicating that MNEs with higher productivity are 
more likely to be engaged in complex VFDI than those with lower productivity. 
 
==  Table 8  == 
 
Next, we perform two robustness checks. First, our specification for a dependent 
variable may yield an unexpected downward bias in coefficients for weighting matrices 
when the FDI type changes from pure VFDI to complex VFDI. From the theoretical 
point of view, such a change not only gives rise to new observations with non-zero sales 
but also may decrease the sales of observations which had non-zero sales in pure VFDI. 
Using the terminology in section 3, we can say that such a change may decrease the 
product sales of affiliates in country 2 although sales turn out to be positive for affiliates 
in country 3. This decrease would give rise to a downward bias in coefficients for 
weighting matrices. To avoid such a bias as easily as possible, we use as a dependent 
variable a binary variable, which takes unity if a firm locates an affiliate in a region (i.e. 
if the previous dependent variable has positive values) and zero otherwise. Here we 
employ a probit estimation technique which in a spatial context is examined in Beron 
and Vijverberg (2004).We use Newey’s (1987) minimum chi-squared estimator in 
particular to obtain consistent estimators (IVProbit). The results are shown in Tables 9 
and 10 and are unchanged from the baseline results. 
 
==  Tables 9 and 10  == 
 
     Second, we restrict our sample only to affiliates categorized as VFDI in section 2. 
This restriction is natural in order to shed light on the contrast in mechanics between 
pure and complex VFDI. As argued in section 3, positive estimates of the weighting 
matrices should emerge only in complex VFDI. But the estimates of these matrices still 
suffer from unexpected bias if the sample includes affiliates categorized as other than 
VFDI, e.g. HFDI. Thus, to focus on the contrast between pure and complex VFDI, the 
sample here is restricted to the affiliates categorized as VFDI. The results are provided 
in Tables 11 and 12, being qualitatively unchanged from the baseline results. In sum, we 
 18
can again confirm the validity of the mechanics of complex VFDI in Japanese FDI to 
East Asian countries and that MNEs with high productivity are more likely to be 
engaged in complex VFDI. 
 
==  Tables 11 and 12  == 
 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we statistically tested the validity of the mechanics of complex 
VFDI in Japanese machinery FDI to East Asia. Our model showed that in complex 
VFDI, the production activity of affiliates in a given country is positively related to that 
in neighboring countries which have large differences in factor prices with the given 
country. Furthermore, we showed that firms with high productivity are likely to choose 
a complex VFDI strategy rather than one based on pure VFDI. On this basis, we 
estimated a multiple spatial-lag model for Japanese machinery FDI to East Asia. Our 
empirical results showed that the mechanics of complex VFDI work in Japanese FDI to 
East Asia and that these mechanics work more strongly in the MNEs with higher 
productivity. 
Our results tell us an important implication for the policies of developing 
countries to attract MNEs. Policy makers in developing countries have been afraid of 
the drain of multinational firms to other developing countries with lower wages. In the 
ASEAN countries, for example, policy makers tend to perceive China as a potential 
threat. To deter the drain of MNEs from their countries, these policy makers believe it is 
crucial to reduce trade and investment barriers to potential investor countries such as 
Japan and the U.S. However, our results indicate that they should reduce the barriers not 
only to the investor countries but also to the countries that they regard as a threat. In 
short, it is important for countries with medium-level economic development to become 
hub-countries in international production networks. 
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Appendix A. Country List in Tables 1-4 
North America Asia Europe
Canada Bangladesh Austria
United States China Belgium
Hong Kong, China CIS
India Czech
Indonesia Denmark
Korea, Rep. Finland
Malaysia France
Myanmar Germany
Pakistan Hungary
Philippines Ireland
Singapore Italy
Sri Lanka Netherlands
Taiwan Poland
Thailand Portugal
Vietnam Rumania
Russian Federation
Slovakia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkish
United Kingdom
Yugoslavia  
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Appendix B. Construction of Variables Used for the TFP Index 
 
Output, intermediate input, labor input, and deflators 
Real gross output is measured as sales deflated by the output deflator, while 
intermediate input is the cost of materials deflated by the input deflator. Labor input is 
measured by the total number of employees. All output and input deflators were 
obtained from the JIP Database 2008 (Fukao et al., 2006). 
 
Capital stock 
Following Fukao et al. (2006), we used for the capital stock the nominal book 
values of tangible assets by multiplying the ratio of the net stock with the book value of 
industry-level capital. Net capital stocks by industry are from the JIP Database 2008, 
while the book values of capital by industry were obtained by aggregating the individual 
data from the Financial Statement Statistic of Corporations by Industry. 
 
Cost shares 
To construct the TFP index, we needed the ratios of labor costs, intermediate 
input costs, and capital costs to total costs. We calculated labor costs as total salaries and 
intermediate input costs as the sum of raw materials, fuel, electricity and subcontracting 
expenses for consigned production. Capital costs were calculated by multiplying the 
real net capital stock with the user cost of capital, PK. The latter was estimated as 
follows: 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+=
I
I
tIK P
PrPP
&δ , 
where PI is the price of investment goods, r the interest rate, and δ  the depreciation 
rate. Data on the price of investment goods and the depreciation rate were calculated 
using the investment and capital stock matrices from the JIP Database 2008.9 Interest 
rates (10-year-bond yields) are from the Bank of Japan. 
 
                                                  
9 The JIP Database provides investment and capital stock matrices by industry and assets for 108 
industries and 39 types of assets. We calculated the weighted averages of price indices for 
investment goods and the depreciation rates by industry. 
 21
References 
Ando, M. and Kimura, F., 2007, “Fragmentation in Europe and East Asia: Evidences 
from International Trade and FDI Data”, In P-B Ruffini and J-K Kim eds., 
Corporate Strategies in the Age of Regional Integration, Edward Elgar: 52-76. 
Anselin, L., 1988, Spatial Econometrics: Methods and Models, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, Boston, MA. 
Baltagi, B.H., Egger, P., Pfaffermayr, M., 2007, “Estimating Models of Complex FDI: 
are There Third-country Effects?”, Journal of Econometrics, 140: 260-281.  
Bernard, A. and Jensen, B., 1999, “Exceptional Exporter Performance: Cause, Effect, or 
Both?”, Journal of International Economics, 47(1): 1-25. 
Beron, K. and Vijverberg, W., 2004, Probit in a Spatial Context: A Monte Carlo 
Analysis, In L. Anselin, Raymond, J., Florax, G. M., and Rey, S. J. eds., Advances 
Iin Spatial Econometrics: Methodology, Tools And Applications (Advances in 
Spatial Science), Springer: 169-195. 
Blonigen, B., Davies, R., Waddella, G., and Naughtona, H., 2007, “FDI in Space: 
Spatial Autoregressive Relationships in Foreign Direct Investment”, European 
Economic Review, 51(5): 1303-1325. 
Caves, D., Christensen, L., and Diewert, W., 1982, “Output, Input and Productivity 
Using Superlative Index Numbers”, Economic Journal, 92: 73-96. 
Caves, D., Christensen, L., and Tretheway, M., 1983, “Productivity Performance of U.S. 
Trunk and Local Service Airline in the Era of Deregulation”, Economic Inquire, 
21: 312-324. 
Coughlin, C. and Segev, E., 2000, “Foreign Direct Investment in China: a Spatial 
Econometric Study”, The World Economy, 23(1): 1–23.  
Dow, M., 2007, “Galton’s Problem as Multiple Network Autocorrelation Effects 
Cultural Trait Transmission and Ecological Constraint”, Cross-Cultural Research, 
41(4): 336-363. 
Ekholm, K., Forslid, R., and Markusen, J., 2007, “Export-platform Foreign Direct 
Investment”, Journal of European Economic Association, 5(4): 776-795. 
Feinberg, S. and Keane, M., 2006, “Accounting for the Growth of MNC-Based Trade 
Using a Structural Model of U.S. MNCs”, The American Economic Review, 
96(5): 1515-1558. 
Fukao, K., Hamagata, S., Inui, T., Ito, K., Kwon, H., Makino, T., Miyagawa, T., 
Nakanishi, Y., and Tokui, J., 2006, “Estimation Procedures and TFP Analysis of 
the JIP Database 2006”, RIETI Discussion Paper Series 07-E-003. 
Good, D., Nadri, I., Roeller, L., and Sickles, R., 1983, “Efficiency and Productivity 
 22
 23
Growth Comparisons of European and U.S Air Carriers: A First Look at the Data”, 
Journal of Productivity Analysis, 4: 115-125. 
Grossman, G., Helpman, E., and Szeidl, A., 2006, “Optimal Integration Strategies for 
the Multinational Firm”, Journal of International Economics, 70: 216-238. 
Hanson, G., Mataloni, R., and Slaughter, M., 2005, “Vertical Production Networks in 
Multinational Firms,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 87(4): 664-678. 
Head, K. and Ries, J., 2003, “Heterogeneity and the FDI versus Export Decision of 
Japanese Manufacturers”, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 
17: 448-467. 
Helpman, E., Melitz, M., and Yeaple, S., 2004. “Export versus FDI with Heterogeneous 
Firms”, American Economic Review, 94(1): 300–316. 
Jones R.W. and Kierzkowski H., 1990, “The Role of Services in Production and 
International Trade: a Theoretical Framework”, In R.W. Jones and Krueger A.O. 
eds., The Political Economy of International Trade: Essays in Honor of R.E. 
Baldwin, Basil Blackwell, Oxford: 31-48. 
Kelejian, H. and Prucha, I., 1998, “A Generalized Spatial Two-Stage Least Squares 
Procedure for Estimating a Spatial Autoregressive Model with Autoregressive 
Disturbances”, Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 17(1): 99-121. 
Melitz, M., 2003, “The Impact of Trade on Intraindustry Reallocations and Aggregate 
Industry Productivity”, Econometrica, 71: 1695-1725. 
Navaretti, B. and Venables, A. J., 2004, Multinational Firms in the World Economy, 
Princeton University Press. 
Newey, W. K., 1987, “Efficient Estimation of Limited Dependent Variable Models with 
Endogenous Explanatory Variables”, Journal of Econometrics, 36: 231-250. 
UNCTAD, 1993, World Investment Report, United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, New York. 
UNCTAD, 1998, World Investment Report, United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, New York. 
UNCTAD, 2002, World Investment Report, United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, New York. 
Yeaple, S., 2003, “The Complex Integration Strategies of Multinationals and Cross 
Country Dependencies in the Structure of Foreign Direct Investment”, Journal of 
International Economics, 60(2): 293–314. 
 
Table 1. The Average Number of Affiliates by Region, Parent Size, and Parent Industry 
Parent size Small Medium Large Total Small Medium Large Total Small Medium Large Total
1995
General machinery 1.00 1.17 1.28 1.20 1.21 1.81 2.52 2.03 1.00 1.00 2.50 2.00
Electronic machinery and equipment 1.00 1.00 1.20 1.15 1.20 1.33 3.27 2.50 1.00 1.79 1.69
Information and communication devices 1.00 1.10 1.06 1.06 1.41 2.20 3.87 2.73 1.00 1.25 2.48 2.10
Automobiles 1.00 1.00 1.12 1.08 1.00 1.25 2.78 2.31 1.00 1.96 1.92
Transport equipment 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.75 1.80 2.00 2.00
Precision instruments 1.00 1.00 1.13 1.09 1.33 1.11 1.67 1.38 2.00 1.00 1.25 1.30
Wholesale of machinery products 1.00 1.00 1.22 1.13 1.75 1.67 4.30 2.67 1.00 1.25 2.71 2.08
1998
General machinery 1.09 1.18 1.32 1.23 1.33 1.90 2.91 2.17 1.17 2.52 2.06
Electronic machinery and equipment 1.00 1.00 1.21 1.15 1.38 1.83 3.30 2.47 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.80
Information and communication devices 1.00 1.10 1.17 1.14 1.63 1.92 4.24 2.80 1.00 1.33 2.56 2.19
Automobiles 1.00 1.10 1.12 1.11 1.71 1.58 3.43 2.59 1.00 1.00 2.03 1.84
Transport equipment 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.50 1.38 1.00 4.00 2.50
Precision instruments 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.14 1.27 2.56 1.67 2.00 2.00 2.00
Wholesale of machinery products 1.00 1.00 1.45 1.26 1.71 1.83 4.67 2.70 1.00 1.50 4.09 3.12
2001
General machinery 1.07 1.11 1.19 1.13 1.47 2.00 2.68 2.04 1.00 1.22 2.36 1.81
Electronic machinery and equipment 1.00 1.00 1.07 1.04 1.25 1.83 3.80 2.57 1.00 1.67 1.71 1.63
Information and communication devices 1.00 1.07 1.11 1.08 1.79 2.33 4.17 3.02 1.67 1.00 2.36 2.00
Automobiles 1.00 1.07 1.15 1.11 1.29 1.47 3.79 2.74 1.00 1.00 1.95 1.82
Transport equipment 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 2.20 1.78 2.50 2.50
Precision instruments 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.17 1.46 2.10 1.62 2.00 2.13 2.11
Wholesale of machinery products 1.00 1.00 1.43 1.20 1.37 2.67 5.15 2.83 1.00 1.25 4.33 3.21
Affiliates in AsiaAffiliates in North America Affiliates in Europe
 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
Note: Parent size is measured by the number of employees, and “Small”, “Medium”, and “Large” indicates firms with less than 300 employees, more than 
300 and less than 1,000 employees, and more than 1,000 employees, respectively. 
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Table 2. The Ratio of VFDI Affiliates to All Affiliates by Affiliate Industry 
NAmerica Asia Europe
1995
General machinery 10% 32% 10%
Electronic machinery and equipment 18% 42% 20%
Information and communication devices 38% 57% 23%
Transport equipment 16% 24% 23%
Precision instruments 34% 63% 40%
1998
General machinery 18% 41% 22%
Electronic machinery and equipment 18% 46% 13%
Information and communication devices 26% 62% 20%
Transport equipment 13% 32% 16%
Precision instruments 49% 64% 58%
2001
General machinery 21% 43% 23%
Electronic machinery and equipment 18% 47% 22%
Information and communication devices 22% 58% 16%
Transport equipment 21% 36% 19%
Precision instruments 22% 55% 20%  
Source: Authors’ calculation 
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Table 3. The Ratio of Complex VFDI Affiliates to All VFDI Affiliates by Affiliate 
Industry 
NAmerica Asia Europe
1995
General machinery 25% 31% 20%
Electronic machinery and equipment 0% 36% 0%
Information and communication devices 8% 39% 6%
Transport equipment 7% 14% 5%
Precision instruments 0% 32% 6%
1998
General machinery 4% 27% 4%
Electronic machinery and equipment 9% 36% 0%
Information and communication devices 4% 37% 3%
Transport equipment 11% 16% 5%
Precision instruments 8% 32% 8%
2001
General machinery 17% 20% 7%
Electronic machinery and equipment 8% 40% 0%
Information and communication devices 6% 42% 14%
Transport equipment 5% 21% 4%
Precision instruments 0% 31% 20%  
Source: Authors’ calculation 
 
 26
Table 4. The Ratio of Complex VFDI-Type Affiliates to VFDI-Type Affiliates by Parent 
Size 
NAmerica Asia Europe
1995
Small Firms 22% 35% 0%
Large Firms 7% 33% 7%
1998
Small Firms 6% 30% 0%
Large Firms 8% 32% 4%
2001
Small Firms 15% 31% 14%
Large Firms 6% 35% 7%  
Source: Authors’ calculation 
Note: The terms “Small Firms” and “Large Firms” denote those with less than 1,000 employees and 
more than 1,000 employees, respectively. 
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Table 5. The Ratio of Complex VFDI-Type Affiliates to VFDI-Type Affiliates by Parent 
Productivity 
NAmerica Asia Europe
1995
Less Productive Firms 14% 36% 14%
More Productive Firms 4% 31% 3%
1998
Less Productive Firms 11% 25% 5%
More Productive Firms 5% 36% n.a.
2001
Less Productive Firms 7% 31% 7%
More Productive Firms 8% 38% 12%  
Source: Authors’ calculation 
Note: The terms “Less Productive Firms” and “More Productive Firms” denote those with less than 
and more than the median of all VFDI firms, respectively. “n.a.” means “not available”. 
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Table 6. Correlation Matrix 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Y (1) 1
GDP (2) 0.00 1
Risk (3) 0.08 0.54 1
Distance from JPN (4) 0.03 -0.66 -0.26 1
Wages (5) -0.01 0.54 0.70 -0.29 1
WD Y (6) 0.30 -0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.04 1
WG Y (7) 0.25 -0.01 -0.07 -0.01 0.01 0.80 1
AWD Y (8) 0.30 -0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.05 0.98 0.79 1
AWG Y (9) 0.26 -0.01 -0.07 -0.01 0.02 0.79 0.97 0.83  
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Table 7. Baseline Results: Hypothesis 1 
Estimation Method OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Explanatory Variables
GDP -0.01 -0.012 -0.01 -0.009 -0.011 -0.012
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
Risk 0.417*** 0.461*** 0.414*** 0.444*** 0.421*** 0.468***
[0.017] [0.018] [0.017] [0.018] [0.017] [0.018]
Distance from JPN 0.019** 0.028*** 0.017** 0.012 0.028*** 0.031***
[0.008] [0.010] [0.008] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
Wages -0.113*** -0.119*** -0.114*** -0.127*** -0.107*** -0.118***
[0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Weighting Matrices
Proximity 0.488*** 0.143 0.542*** 0.944***
[0.021] [0.221] [0.012] [0.031]
Gap 0.073*** 0.802*** 0.492*** 0.987***
[0.022] [0.223] [0.014] [0.032]
Observation 18,180 18,180 18,180 18,180 18,180 18,180
(1) (2) (3)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  ***, **, and * show 1%, 5%, and 10% significant, 
respectively. Year dummies are added. 
 
 
 
Table 8. Baseline Results: Hypothesis 2 
Estimation Method OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Explanatory Variables
GDP -0.01 -0.01 -0.009 -0.01 -0.011 -0.011
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
Risk 0.415*** 0.401*** 0.412*** 0.401*** 0.419*** 0.416***
[0.017] [0.018] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.018]
Distance from JPN 0.019** 0.021** 0.018** 0.020** 0.028*** 0.027***
[0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
Wages -0.112*** -0.107*** -0.113*** -0.108*** -0.107*** -0.106***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Weighting Matrices
TFP * Proximity 0.396*** 0.258 0.445*** 0.317***
[0.018] [0.162] [0.010] [0.032]
TFP * Gap 0.064*** 0.046 0.412*** 0.380***
[0.019] [0.175] [0.011] [0.035]
Observation 18,180 18,180 18,180 18,180 18,180 18,180
(6)(4) (5)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  ***, **, and * show 1%, 5%, and 10% significant, 
respectively. Year dummies are added.
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Table 9. Probit Results: Hypothesis 1 
Estimation Method Probit IVProbit Probit IVProbit Probit IVProbit
Explanatory Variables
GDP -0.023 -0.031 -0.021 -0.019 -0.032 -0.035
[0.025] [0.027] [0.025] [0.026] [0.025] [0.026]
Risk 1.409*** 1.555*** 1.397*** 1.496*** 1.406*** 1.560***
[0.059] [0.064] [0.059] [0.061] [0.059] [0.062]
Distance from JPN 0.076*** 0.113*** 0.071** 0.056* 0.110*** 0.119***
[0.028] [0.033] [0.028] [0.029] [0.028] [0.029]
Wages -0.380*** -0.393*** -0.379*** -0.421*** -0.356*** -0.392***
[0.019] [0.022] [0.019] [0.021] [0.019] [0.020]
Weighting Matrices
Proximity 1.429*** 0.063 1.575*** 2.844***
[0.066] [0.739] [0.040] [0.103]
Gap 0.194*** 2.784*** 1.419*** 2.949***
[0.070] [0.745] [0.042] [0.104]
(1) (2) (3)
Observation 18,180 18,180 18,180 18,180 18,180 18,180
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  ***, **, and * show 1%, 5%, and 10% significant, 
respectively. Year dummies are added. 
 
 
 
Table 10. Probit Results: Hypothesis 2 
Estimation Method Probit IVProbit Probit IVProbit Probit IVProbit
Explanatory Variables
GDP -0.022 -0.024 -0.02 -0.023 -0.032 -0.032
[0.025] [0.026] [0.025] [0.026] [0.025] [0.025]
Risk 1.403*** 1.361*** 1.391*** 1.356*** 1.404*** 1.394***
[0.059] [0.063] [0.059] [0.060] [0.059] [0.060]
Distance from JPN 0.077*** 0.091*** 0.072*** 0.080*** 0.110*** 0.110***
[0.028] [0.032] [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.028]
Wages -0.376*** -0.355*** -0.376*** -0.359*** -0.356*** -0.353***
[0.019] [0.020] [0.019] [0.020] [0.019] [0.020]
Weighting Matrices
TFP * Proximity 1.153*** 0.54 1.286*** 0.890***
[0.057] [0.540] [0.032] [0.104]
TFP * Gap 0.171*** 0.324 1.184*** 1.102***
[0.060] [0.586] [0.034] [0.112]
Observation 18,180 18,180 18,180 18,180 18,180 18,180
(6)(4) (5)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  ***, **, and * show 1%, 5%, and 10% significant, 
respectively. Year dummies are added.
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Table 11. Regression Results for VFDI Affiliates: Hypothesis 1 
Estimation Method OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Explanatory Variables
GDP -0.278*** -0.318*** -0.261*** -0.260*** -0.315*** -0.347***
[0.078] [0.082] [0.079] [0.080] [0.079] [0.082]
Risk 3.590*** 3.856*** 3.541*** 3.755*** 3.618*** 3.924***
[0.176] [0.184] [0.176] [0.181] [0.178] [0.185]
Distance from JPN 0.354*** 0.437*** 0.293*** 0.191** 0.527*** 0.555***
[0.088] [0.118] [0.087] [0.090] [0.088] [0.091]
Wages -1.114*** -1.070*** -1.167*** -1.293*** -0.951*** -0.965***
[0.062] [0.095] [0.062] [0.064] [0.062] [0.064]
Weighting Matrices
Proximity 0.455*** 0.300 0.608*** 0.931***
[0.027] [0.200] [0.014] [0.027]
Gap 0.190*** 0.653*** 0.604*** 0.989***
[0.028] [0.206] [0.015] [0.028]
(1) (2) (3)
Observation 11,430 11,430 11,430 11,430 11,430 11,430
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  ***, **, and * show 1%, 5%, and 10% significant, 
respectively. Year dummies are added. 
 
 
 
Table 12. Regression Results for VFDI Affiliates: Hypothesis 2 
Estimation Method OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Explanatory Variables
GDP -0.272*** -0.289*** -0.256*** -0.259*** -0.310*** -0.302***
[0.079] [0.082] [0.079] [0.080] [0.079] [0.080]
Risk 3.560*** 3.411*** 3.517*** 3.366*** 3.588*** 3.507***
[0.176] [0.186] [0.177] [0.182] [0.178] [0.183]
Distance from JPN 0.368*** 0.490*** 0.313*** 0.381*** 0.521*** 0.514***
[0.088] [0.112] [0.087] [0.090] [0.088] [0.088]
Wages -1.104*** -0.959*** -1.153*** -1.064*** -0.953*** -0.948***
[0.062] [0.091] [0.062] [0.066] [0.062] [0.063]
Weighting Matrices
TFP * Proximity 0.365*** 0.038 0.489*** 0.294***
[0.023] [0.161] [0.011] [0.044]
TFP * Gap 0.150*** 0.263 0.486*** 0.398***
[0.024] [0.170] [0.012] [0.047]
Observation 11,430 11,430 11,430 11,430 11,430 11,430
(6)(4) (5)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  ***, **, and * show 1%, 5%, and 10% significant, 
respectively. Year dummies are added. 
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Figure 1. Domestic Production and Pure VFDI to Country 2 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Domestic Production and Pure VFDI to Country 3 
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Figure 3. Domestic Production, Pure VFDI, and Complex VFDI 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Domestic Production and Complex VFDI 
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